There was always debate regarding whether judges act as makers or discoverers of law is a profound topic that has captured the attention of legal scholars and esteemed judges alike. This discussion has not emerged in isolation; rather, it has evolved over centuries, reflecting the thoughts and philosophies of jurists through the ages. In Pakistan, judges have contributed their insights on this critical issue, shedding light on the unique practices and adjudication methods that shape our legal system. Their perspectives highlight the tension between the creation of new legal precedents and the interpretation of existing laws, illustrating the complex role judges play in the judicial process.

Precedents serve as a vital source of law in the subcontinent, guiding legal practitioners and influencing judicial decision-making. Judges turn to these established precedents as touchstones in their rulings, maintaining a sense of continuity and tradition. Moreover, their decisions are often shaped by customs from the eighteenth century, which adds a historical dimension to contemporary legal interpretations.

The question of whether judges create or discover the law has sparked a vigorous and ongoing debate among legal scholars and practitioners. Esteemed jurists have offered diverse perspectives on this intricate issue, each contributing to a rich tapestry of legal thought. This dialogue reflects the complexity of the law and the varying interpretations that arise from different legal philosophies. In the following discussion, I will highlight the views of some of these influential jurists, providing insight into their reasoning before concluding this ongoing discourse.

The jurists Bacon, Hale, and Blackstone observed that judges can only clarify and explain the law. On the other side, some of the famous judges Bentham, Austin, Salmond, and Lord Dennining express their views that the jurists and judges are creators of law and they can make it. These two different opinions are the two theories of judicial process: declaratory and creative.

Declarative theory is defined by its founder, Sir Matthew Hale, a famous seventeenth-century judge. Judges do not make law, but they have the weight of giving direction to the authorities to make law, and precedents are such evidence to give decisions on any case. Mansfield expressed in the eighteenth century: "The Law of England would be a curious science if, to be certain it was chosen perspectives." On another occasion, he remarked: "The clarification and soul of cases make law, not the letter of explicit perspectives."

Sir William Blackstone, in his Assessments on the Law of Britain, confirmed that the outdated shows and uses of Britain are the substance of the standard law. He thought the focal control of courts was to uncover customs and to establish their validity. He recognised that an appointed authority has given out force not to make new laws, but to uphold and better the previous ones. Worth Joseph Story was in like manner a relative presumption.

In 1892, Ruler Esher granted that it isn't more right than wrong to communicate that judges make law at any rate, rather they should apply a previously made one. In any case, this doesn't mean that new laws can't be made. Moreover, the Court of Chancery expresses that laws are judge-made. Truly, it is hard for the advanced authentic backers to concur with the speculation imparted so far. They recognise that judges make the laws, as was said by Mellish LJ.

The groundwork for the theory by the adjudicators has been that the choices of the appointed authorities never make law. Reason by equivalence has been followed back to the thirteenth century, at which point Bracton said that if anything undifferentiated from happened as of now by then, that should be used to censure another case. The defenders of this view, Bernheimer says, appear to propose that this isn't only the viewpoint but something behind or past it that gives him authority and force. It is an issue essential why such mind-blowing law experts Blackstone and Quality were so attached to the criticalness of customs. The response to this was that, in their time, cases were shut by customs. A response to any genuine solicitation was offered by what the shows state.

Judges don't make laws, considering the way that the current law gives all the assets for their choices. A named authority doesn't pick a case in a lawful vacuum, yet is reliant on existing guidelines, which express, and, at the same time, are informed by major credible measures. The undertaking of the assigned authority, as opposed to a hard case is, subsequently, to acknowledge what choice is required by the entire doctrinal structure of existing law.

In my personal opinion, shaped by my understanding of the judicial system, judges should not be seen as lawmakers. Their fundamental responsibility lies in interpreting the existing laws carefully analysing the language, intent, and application to the unique circumstances of each case. When faced with situations where applicable laws are absent or unclear, judges play a critical role by providing insightful guidance and recommendations to legislative bodies. They can urge these bodies to take action and address the gaps in the legal framework, ensuring that justice is served and societal needs are met.

It's important to recognise that judges are not elected officials; they do not derive their authority from the will of the people. Instead, they are appointed or nominated, which distinguishes them from legislators who are directly elected by the public. Legislators are accountable to their constituents, and it is their responsibility to enact laws that serve the interests of the community and promote the welfare of the state. Ultimately, the law-making process is a democratic function that should reflect the collective will of the people, while the judiciary serves to uphold and implement those laws fairly and impartially.